Inadequacies of the Price Freeze in a Crisis by Convisser, Israel
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
1955
Inadequacies of the Price Freeze in a Crisis
Israel Convisser
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Convisser, Israel, "Inadequacies of the Price Freeze in a Crisis" (1955). Minnesota Law Review. 1516.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/1516
INADEQUACIES OF THE PRICE FREEZE
IN A CRISIS
ISRAEL CONVISSER*
The cease-fire in Indo-China has lifted the threat of American
involvement as a belligerent in that war and perhaps in the larger
war that could easily have ensued. That we were actually on the
verge of such involvement is gaining increasing recognition.
This averted, much talking and some thinking are being done
about the lessons to be derived from this one of a series of crises
in a trigger-happy world.
One lesson, deserving but not receiving much public attention,
is the obvious one that a major war is a major possibility which, if
it eventuates, will require the imposition of economic controls.
This is not to suggest that the problem is being officially ignored.
On the contrary, the government is giving consideration to meas-
ures of control that could be utilized if the need for them should
arise.
Specious Justification for the Freeze
With respect to price controls, the administration's present
plan seems to be either to request stand-by authority to impose a
ninety-day freeze of prices or, what is more likely, to await the
development of an emergency and then propose that Congress
hastily enact such a freeze. The basic justification for this plan is
that it would permit the price line to be held while allowing time
for careful study and enactment of legislation adequate and appro-
priate to the need.
Such an approach would be persuasive but for its failure to
consider a very grave possibility. If we should become involved in
a nuclear war, many of our productive and distributive facilities
will be disrupted or wholly destroyed, water supplies contaminated,
urban centers evacuated. There will be emergency need for evacu-
ation sites and enormous supplies of water, food, clothing, beds
and linens for evacuees and doctors, nurses, medicines and medical
supplies for the injured. Washington itself may well be one of the
first cities to be attacked. In this context of crisis and chaos it
seems naive to expect a legislative body to deliberate and legislate
with the objectivity and study necessary for the shaping of effective
economic controls. If study, deliberation and objectivity are wanted,
*Member, New York and District of Columbia Bars; formerly assistant
chief counsel, Office of Price Stabilization.
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as indeed they should be, the necessary planning should be done
now-when there is no crisis to supplant them with haste, con-
fusion and expediency.
This apart, however, there are difficulties inherent in a ninety-
day freeze that cast serious doubt upon it as an effective or suitable
instrument.
Lack of an Administering Agency
By way of introduction, it should be recalled that in 1953
Chairman Capehart of the Senate Banking and Currency Com-
mittee introduced a bill granting stand-by authority to impose a
ninety-day price freeze in an emergency. However, his bill, called
the Emergency Stabilization Act of 1953, proposed the continuance
on a stand-by and advisory basis of the Office of Price Stabiliza-
tion. The bill was defeated and OPS was permitted to go out of
existence.
With OPS gone, the Office of Defense Mobilization, which is
doing some work in the field of price controls, would probably be
the logical agency from which to start the formation of a price
control organization. But ODM, which is charged with a great
many responsibilities in addition to economic controls, has a total
staff of only a few hundred. Its Stabilization Division, which is
concerned not only with price controls but also with rationing,
wage and rent controls, constmer credit restrictions and emergency
taxes, includes but a fraction of the agency personnel.' In light of
the fact that OPS had a peak staff of some 12,0002 and its predeces-
sor, the Office of Price Administration, at its height, had over
60,000 employees, 3 it must be clear that for all practical purposes
there is no stand-by agency in being. And, since the Government
does not plan to request authaority to create one, there is none in
prospect.
What we must therefore look forward to, if the need for con-
trols should arise, is a freeze of prices without an administering
1. ODM, during the hearirgs on its proposed budget for fiscal 1955,
requested a total staff of ten professionals and six clericals for its Stabiliza-
tion Division. Even this request was actually reduced to four professionals
and one clerical. Hearings before the House Subcommittee on Appropriations.
Independent Offices Appropriation Bill, 1955, 83d Cong., 2d Session, 1182,
1261-1263 (Part 2) (1954). These figures do not include consultants serving
without compensation.
2. According to the report of Price Director Tighe E. Woods to the
Joint Commitee on Defense Production, dated September 17, 1952, "[bly the
end of May 1952 a peak employment of 12,129 had been reached."
3. "A Short History of OPA," p. 226.
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agency.4 'his will have certain inevitable and serious consequences.
These will perhaps be clearer if we first have an understanding of
what the freeze legislation will provide.
In forecasting the general provisions of the freeze statute the
writer makes no pretension to prophetic insight. But he was with
both OPA and OPS. He played a small part in the drafting of
the General Ceiling Price Regulation5 with which OPS froze prices
during the Korean War. A prodigious effort was made to avoid
some of the troublesome provisions of the General Maximum Price
Regulation6 issued by OPA during World War II. But the prob-
lem proved insuperable and it turned out that the two regulations
were basically and substantially the same. He believes it reasonable
to assume, therefore, that the next freeze will follow the same
pattern.
Freeze Provisions
It will provide that on and after a stated date it will be unlaw-
ful for anyone to offer or sell any commodity or service at a price
above that at which he sold it during a specified base period. For
items offered for sale but not actually sold during the base period
the ceilings will be the prices at which they were offered. Since
new commodities and variations of old ones are constantly being
produced, the ceilings on these will be the same as the ceilings on
similar items sold during the base period. If the seller had no similar
item he will be permitted to determine his ceilings either by add-
ing to his cost the mark-up on commodities having similar costs
or by taking the ceilings of his closest competitor. Those who go
into business after the freeze date will be permitted to select one
or more competitors whose ceilings they will take as their own.
Purchasers of commodities or services for use in their businesses
or for resale will be forbidden to offer or pay above-ceiling prices.
Even with a fully staffed agency to administer it such a freeze
would present a host of complex and difficult problems. Without
such an agency the difficulties will be so numerous and trouble-
some as to impair and perhaps even destroy the effectiveness of
the control.7
4. See Durham and Caplan, Stabilization Planning Under the National
Security Act, 19 Law & Contemp. Prob. 477 (1954).
5. 16 Fed. Reg. 808 (1951).
6. 7 Fed. Reg. 3153 (1942).
7. It is noteworthy in this connection that in late 1950, notwithstanding
mounting inflation, Economic Stabilization Director Valentine opposed the
imposition of price and wage controls on the ground, among others, that
his staff was far too small to cope with all the problems that would inevitably
arise. He resigned and Michael Di Salle, newly appointed Director of Price
Stabilization, issued the freeze regulation despite the serious handicaps.
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And unless there is a stand-by agency existing in advance of
the freeze there will be no functioning agency during its three-
month existence. For if authorization for the creation of the agency
is to be concurrent with enactment of the freeze legislation, the
three months will be consumed in the process of organization. It
will be necessary to procure and furnish quarters for national,
regional and district offices; to recruit large numbers of economists,
business specialists, lawyers, accountants and other trained techni-
cians; to assemble and analyze vast quantities of economic and
other data; and to draft a chart of organization, procedural regu-
lations and standard practice instructions for personnel. This, of
course, is to say nothing of the delays that will be entailed in per-
sonnel security clearances.
Until at least a basic organizational core will have been created
it will be as if no agency existed. Actually it will be worse, for the
job of organization will be delayed by complaints, requests for in-
formation and advice, and visits from businessmen, lawyers, ac-
countants and trade associations seeking relief from unnecessary
distortions, hardships and inequities. These, together with public
criticisms that will inevitably follow, will consume the precious time
of agency personnel who, in any event, will be unable to do more
than plead for patience until the agency is sufficiently organized to
cope with these and other problems. Meanwhile the problems will
grow in number and urgency.
Unavailability of Official Interpretations
There will be, to begin with, the need for interpretations. Con-
trol agencies in the past have had interpretation divisions which,
in response to requests from within and without the agencies, gave
their official views of the meaning of statutory and regulatory pro-
visions. OPA and OPS issued thousands of interpretations. These
were of great value to businessmen who wished to comply fully
with what was required of them but understandably preferred not to
subject themselves to unnecessary limitations. The inability to ob-
tain official interpretations will create many difficulties and result
in numerous involuntary violations while, at the same time, serv-
ing as an excuse for equally numerous deliberate ones.
It is not feasible here to list more than the following few samples
to illustrate the range and variety of questions that will be asked.
A merchant who had a clearance sale throughout the base period,
selling many items below cost, will want to know whether these
sale prices will now be his ceiling prices.
[Vol. 39:185
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A manufacturer or retailer of a two-piece suit, identical, except
for the lack of a vest, with a three piece suit sold in the base period
will ask whether these are to be considered the same suits and
whether the base period price of the one is the appropriate ceiling
of the other.
An auctioneer who sells commodities to the highest bidders
will inquire whether his sales are subject to the freeze and, if so,
how he is to determine his ceilings.
A manufacturer, having several classes of 1urchasers to whom
he sells under long term contracts, will present the following prob-
lem. During the base period he announced a general price increase.
His contract with company A, his largest purchaser, having ex-
pired, he entered into a new contract and made sales during the
base period at the increased price. His contracts with purchasers
of other classes, however, expired after the base period. Conse-
quently, his sales to these customers during the base period were
at prices lower than those he charged A. His question will be
whether his ceiling for sales to A will be higher than his ceilings
for his other classes of purchasers notwithstanding that customarily
the reverse was true.
The answers to some of the questions will be fairly clear from
a reading of the statute. Yet these answers in some cases will work
such hardship and, at least to some businessmen, will appear to be
so absurd as to justify the belief that a contrary result must have
been intended. Unable to obtain an official interpretation, many
businessmen will have to make their own determinations and run
the risk of the severe penalties of the law if they should decide
wrongly.
The unavailability of interpretations will thus be extremely
troublesome. But what will be felt at least as keenly will be the
inability to obtain adjustments.
Inability to Obtain Adjustments
The seller who sold at clearance prices during the base period
will face three months of business at a loss. If these months happen
to be his best season he may show a loss for the entire year.
Similar will be the situation of the merchant whose supplier
raised his prices so close to the end of the base period that the
merchant could not put into effect a compensating increase of his
own.
Their prospect will be indeed a gloomy one. Nor will it be
brightened by the appearance of a new competitor, perhaps only a
1955]
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few doors away, selling the same commodities at substantially high-
er ceilings than theirs would normally have been. As a new seller
he will be able to take the ceilings of competitors of his own
selection. -
The manufacturer whose pricing patterns for different classes
of purchasers is disrupted, as well as other sellers subjected to
similar distortions of prices8 and normal business practices, will
be understandably irritated and upset over his inability to obtain
an adjustment in the interests of what many will undoubtedly re-
gard as simple justice and good sense.
Absence of Enforcement
Such disruptions and irritations will lead to violations of both
the innocent and wilful kind. And there will be no real enforce-
ment during the ninety days of the freeze. Price control enforce-
ment requires technical knowledge and training. To ferret out and
prove violations generally calls for skillful analysis of business
records. It will take at least the better part of ninety days to recruit
and properly train investigators and other enforcement personnel
and to formulate needed programs. Meanwhile, other enforcement
agencies, like the FBI, will be reluctant to assume the burden of
price control enforcement since it will involve a program of special
training for a job that will last only until the new price control
agency is ready to take over.
The initial enforcement efforts should be directed, as they
have been in the past, more to achieving compliance than to punish-
ing offenders. At the outset investigators should be seeking and
correcting violations that stein from inadequate understanding of
what is required. In most cases the businessmen involved will
comply with the requirements when they are told how to do so.
With this kind of beginning the innocent violators, in the main,
are brought into compliance and enforcement efforts can then be
concentrated on the wilful ones. But in the case of the contemplated
freeze, violations, both innocent and wilful, will go unapprehended
and uncorrected for months. Many of these will be discovered only
after the freeze will have been replaced by a new price control
statute. By then it will be too late to bring the offender into com-
pliance with the superseded law and there will be no alternative
but to prosecute the innocent with the wilful violator.
8. A case in which the distortion of customary price relationships was
the basis for an unsuccessful attack on the validity of OPA's General Maxi-
mum Price Regulation is Wells Lamont Corporation v. Bowles, 149 F. 2d
364 (Ena. Ct. App. 1945).
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Resultant Widespread Violations
The three elements thus far discussed, unavailability of official
interpretations, inability to obtain relief from price squeezes, in-
equities and disruptions of normal business practices and lack of
enforcement, will present a serious menace to the control program.
Against the background of this troublesome trinity the temptations
and pressures to violate will multiply. As violations are seen to be
committed with impunity other violations will be committed. And
the businessman who, for example, is forced to violate the law by
paying above-ceiling prices in order to procure needed stock, will
be sorely tempted to charge above-ceiling prices in order to main-
tain his profits.
Evasions
In addition to such direct flouting of the law the more subtle
evasions wrl also flourish. The new jobbers will appear upon the
scene and many merchants and manufacturers wil find it impos-
sible to supply their needs except through these jobbers.
This, of course, is not intended to disparage legitimate jobbing
which, in many industries and trades, is an established and accepted
conduit in the system of distribution. The legitimate jobber stocks
merchandise, accepts smaller orders than the manufacturer cares to
handle, extends credit to small purchasers and performs many other
useful functions.
But the jobbers who are spawned only by economic controls do
none of these things. They have connections with sources of sup-
ply, and the goods they order are shipped directly from their sup-
pliers to their customers. Their only function is to add a further
mark-up to the cost of goods.
A variant of the jobber will be the finder. Ostensibly, he will
locate sources of supply of hard-to-get commodities and disclose
these sources for a fee. Actually, he too will have connections who
will sell to new customers only with his approval.
There will be other kinds of evasions. Some meat wholesalers
will abandon the settled practice of selling grocers large wholesale
cuts to be carved by the latter into retail cuts for consumers. These
wholesalers will now sell the grocer only retail cuts and thereby
obtain prices higher than their wholesale ceilings. And sellers in
other industries will require purchasers of carload lots to break
down their orders into less than carload lots so that the price will
be higher than the carload ceiling.
These and many other evasions and violations will be con-
trived. And little or nothing will be able to be done to limit these
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practices for the duration of the freeze.
It is not intended to suggest, of course, that evasions and vio-
lations would not occur if there were an operating agency using
alternative control techniques in place of the freeze. But the dif-
ference in that case would be the existence of an active enforcement
staff to apprehend and prosecute offenders and the ability of the
agency to watch for evasions and amend the regulations to make
them illegal. The chronic violators would continue to operate with-
out regard to regulatory limitations until they were caught. But
these are a relatively small group. For the rest of the business
community there would not be, as it is almost certain there will
be under the freeze, an atmosphere of uncontrolled and unpunished
indifference to the law, an atmosphere that in turn would foster
and encourage further violaticns.
Disappearance of Low Priced Commodities
Finally, apart from evasions and outright violations, there will
be the completely legitimate but nonetheless highly inflationary
movement into higher price lines. This is an almost inevitable con-
sequence of shortages. In a sellers' market a manufacturer generally
has no trouble selling all the commodities he can produce. His
problem is that his output is limited by a scarcity of material, labor
and working space. In this situation he can increase his profit by
turning out a more expensive product, even though he does not
increase his customary percentage mark-up. Thus, if he cannot
increase his volume of 100,000 items a year on which his unit cost
has been three dollars and his selling price four, he will double his
profit by moving into the eight dollar price line and raising his
unit profit from one to two dollars.
As a result, low priced items will tend to disappear from the
market. Restaurants will chancge their menus and serve more costly
meals. Manufacturers of inexpensive clothing, shoes, furniture,
linens and a great variety of other commodities will be replacing
their old lines with new and more expensive ones. In many in-
stances, perhaps even in most, the higher priced item will have a
higher production cost than the article it replaced and, in that
sense, the consumer will be receiving value for what he pays. But,
in clothing, as well as many other commodities, durability is not
necessarily a significant factor in determining relative costs. A
cheap suit or dress will often last as long as, and often outlast,
more expensive garments. The cost differential is frequently ac-
counted for by factors of style and workmanship. Consequently,
it will be small comfort to the small wage earner, who is accus-
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tomed to paying thirty dollars for a suit, to know that the forty
dollar suit, which he will be unable to afford, wil be worth the
money.
The disappearance of low priced goods will bear most heavily
on the large economic group that is least capable of carrying the
burden. To devise a remedy would present an enormous challenge
to the most skillful and ingenious of administrative staffs. Under a
freeze the problem will simply be incapable of solution.
Notwithstanding this gloomy picture, a ninety-day freeze will
admittedly have some effect as a brake on inflation. It is, however,
not an effective brake for a period as long as three months. In less
than that time the difficulties here discussed, as well as others, will
have loosened the brake. And the great danger will be that wide-
spread disapproval and cynicism will result and that price controls
will become so discredited as to make it extremely difficult, if not
wholly impossible, to have an effective program after the freeze.
The most, therefore, that can be said for the proposed freeze
is that it is perhaps better than nothing. But nothing is not and
should not be the alternative.
Two Alternatives
A stand-by agency, doing the necessary preliminary work and
preparing separate regulations adapted to the needs and practices
of the separate industries would obviate most of the difficulties
noted here.
And, if the political climate makes impossible the authorization
of a stand-by agency, the business community, which stands to be
especially hard hit by the disruptions, distortions and inequities of
the freeze, could make a mighty contribution to the solution of the
problem. Each trade and industry could draft an effective regula-
tion, geared to its own settled customs and ways of doing business,
and submit the regulation to the Government for approval and use
when needed.9
Either of these proposals would make for better, more equitable,
more effective control than the contemplated freeze.
For the kind of emergency we may have to face, better than
nothing simply is not good enough. Elementary prudence dictates
that, if the crisis should come, we must be prepared to meet it with
the most effective measures of which we are capable. The ninety-
day freeze does not meet that test.
9. For a fuller discussion of both these proposals, see Convisser, Eco-
nomic Preparedness: The Problem of Price Controls, Va. Quarterly Rev.,
Autumn, 1954.
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